








It is easy for most Christian churches … to see transgender and intersex people as having a disease that has to be cured or corrected, but the idea of giving transgender and intersex persons a unique identity and dignity within the human community does not make sense to them. (Quero 2008: 96) (emphasis original)

	Christian theologians often assume everyone has a clear and stable physical sex, male or female. Some argue that gender identity must match this physical sex only in certain ways in physically, psychologically and spiritually healthy people. However, the existence of intersex conditions and of transgender identities makes clear, first, that not everyone does have a clear male or female physical sex, and second, that gender identity does not ‘match’ physical sex typically for everyone. 
Many intersex people and transgender people consider themselves unremarkable men or women with no particular need for special treatment or accommodations in the area of sexuality. However, the specificities of their body-histories may, for some, mean that theologies of sexuality which assume ‘good’ and ‘healthy’ bodies are always sexed and gendered only in typical ways exclude them from signification, or pathologize their unusual bodies or gender identities. Intersex and transgender are discrete issues and should not be conflated. However, both phenomena, and the experiences of both groups, demonstrate the limitations of theologies which assume always stable, binary models of maleness and femaleness. Sexual theologies for all people must therefore acknowledge that intersex and transgender people may face particular challenges surrounding sexuality, and that intersex and transgender themselves pose questions for sexual theologies assuming stable, binary sex, gender and sexuality. For some scholars, intersex and transgender help to make clear that this model does not tell the whole story. They note that a binary model of sex has not existed in all times and cultures:

Conservatives believe that humans naturally come in two opposite sexes, and they read that ‘truth’ into Genesis 1 and Romans 1 as proof that homosexuality is unnatural and heterosexual complementarity, God’s creative purpose for the sexes … However objective it may seem, even the scientific framework for defining the ‘two sexes’ is a cultural construction. (Swancutt 2006: 70-1)

2.	What is intersex?
	All human foetuses’ genital regions initially appear identical, and typically, beginning around seven weeks’ gestation, most develop along clear male or female lines (Preves 2003: 24-6). XY foetuses usually develop testes, a penis and scrotum, and are brought up as boys from birth; XX foetuses usually develop ovaries, a clitoris and vulva, and are brought up as girls. However, people with intersex conditions – about 1 in every 2,500 people (Preves 2003: 2-3) – have bodies different from typical male or female ones. 
	Formerly, the term ‘hermaphrodite’ was used for people with intersex conditions, but this is misleading and is now considered archaic. ‘Hermaphrodite’ implies someone with a full set of both male and female genitalia. However, intersex conditions mostly fall into two categories:
	Those where the external genitalia look ‘in between’ male and female genitalia (with, for example, a genital tubercle which looks bigger than a clitoris but smaller than a penis);
	Those where the external genitalia look unremarkably male or female, but there are unusual combinations of internal and external characteristics (for example, testes and XY chromosomes, and a clitoris, vulva and vaginal opening).
Until fairly recently, parents of intersex children were encouraged to keep their conditions secret. Many children with unusual genitalia had corrective genital surgery soon after birth (and, sometimes, follow-up surgery through childhood and adolescence). This sometimes involved reducing or entirely removing large clitorises and small penises, with more emphasis placed on appearance than sensation (Preves 2003: 55-6). Most doctors argued early surgery was best for intersex children, so they would grow up as ‘normal’ boys or girls. This was based in the thought of John Money, an influential psychologist and sexologist, who believed gender identity in young children was flexible (Money 1980: 33), and that children could grow up happily in either gender provided their genitals were altered to reinforce the ‘correct’ identity (Money and Ehrhardt 1972: 15). 
However, from the mid-1990s, many intersex people who had had surgery as children argued that this intervention, coupled with the secrecy surrounding their conditions, had caused them more problems than having unusual genitals would have done. Some said they could not enjoy sex as adults because of the physical and psychological scarring caused by early surgery (Kessler 1998: 56). More recently, treatments for intersex are likely to include delayed or less invasive surgery, along with support for children and families as they consider the implications of early, delayed, or no surgery. 
Medical approaches to intersex are clearly influenced by cultural understandings of sex, gender, sexuality, health, disease, disability and embodiment. It is therefore appropriate to ask in what ways these cultural understandings have themselves been influenced by Christian theological accounts, and what standards of goodness and normality in bodies Christian theologians use. The Roman Catholic ethicist Margaret Farley says,

The question for all of us is not only what treatment should be given for a condition considered to be pathological, but whether the condition is pathological or not. In other words, if a culture were less preoccupied with male/female sexual division and with boy/girl, man/woman gender differentiation, would the medical imperative regarding intersexed persons remain as it is? Or more fundamentally, is gender assignment as a ‘pure’ male or female, man or woman, essential to human flourishing? (Farley 2006: 151)
	
3.	What is transgender?
Transgender people feel their gender identity does not ‘fit’ their biological sex. Whilst most biological females identify as women and most biological males as men, transgender men are biologically female but identify as men, and transgender women are biologically male but identify as women. ‘Transgender’ refers to people with a disjunction between their physical sex and gender identity; ‘transsexualism’ refers more specifically to people who have undertaken surgery or hormone therapy to make their bodies ‘fit’ their gender identities. 
	It is unclear what causes transgender. Unlike intersex, where there is a clear variation from typical male or female anatomy, there is not uncontested evidence of a physical difference in transgender people. Some scientists argue that there is a disparity between the brains of transgender and non-transgender people, with some ‘female’ physical brain characteristics in transgender women (Zhou et al 1995; Gooren 2006), but this is contested. Some believe transgender people have variant genes (Hare et al 2009; Bentz et al 2008). Others believe transgender is caused by foetal exposure to unusual levels of hormones during pregnancy (Schneider, Pickel and Stalla 2006). Still others, following the early work of Harry Benjamin, a pioneer in transgender research, believe there is no clear biological basis for transgender and that it arises for other reasons, such as psychological trauma or particular dynamics within families.
There may be many people with feelings of gender dysphoria who never actually transition gender. Up until 2010, about 12,500 people in the UK had sought medical treatment for gender dysphoria (GIRES 2011). In Britain, about 80 per cent of people seeking treatment are male-to-female, and 20 per cent female-to-male (Reed et al 2009: 4), but elsewhere in Europe, the ratio is nearer 50-50 (Reed et al 2009: 17). The average age for starting transition is 42 (GIRES 2011). According to GIRES (Gender Identity Research and Education Society), about 7,500 people in the UK have legally changed their documents since the Gender Recognition Act 2004 was passed.​[1]​ 
Like intersex, transgender is under-acknowledged within Christian theology. Some of the theological work done in the area, such as the Church of England’s 2003 document Some Issues in Human Sexuality did not, suggest critics, take sufficient account of the experiences of transgender people (Beardsley 2005). However, transgender theologians have interpreted the experience of gender transition as a good site of God’s revelation (Tanis 2003).

4.	Intersex, Transgender and Same-Sex Relationships
Some Christian theologians believe all sexual relationships between same-sex partners are illegitimate. Many point to the Bible, which they argue condemns homosexual activity; others point to concepts such as Natural Law or the ‘orders of creation’ and claim that, since a major function of sexual activity is procreation, non-procreative sex (including sex between same-sex partners) is illegitimate. Robert Gagnon explicitly links gender transition with homosexuality, saying, ‘Transsexuality is … an even more extreme version of the problem of homosexuality: an explicit denial of the integrity of one’s own sex and an overt attempt at marring the sacred image of maleness and femaleness formed by God … It is a decisive complaint or rebellion against God for having created oneself as male or female’ (Gagnon 2007: 3-4).  
Alice Domurat Dreger, a historian of medical understandings of unusual bodies, notes that, in nineteenth-century France, doctors were concerned to ‘enunciate a science of “inverted” sexuality’ (Dreger 1998: 128). Many medics and scientists explored how and why some people’s sexuality was ‘inverted’, causing attraction to the same sex rather than ‘natural’ attraction to the opposite sex, and analyzed the causes and outworkings of so-called hermaphroditism. Some believed that homosexual inclination was itself a kind of hermaphroditism (Dreger 1998: 135). Transgender has also been understood, at times, as a logical outworking of same-sex desire: if it is ‘natural’ to desire people of the opposite sex, runs this logic, then if one is a man attracted to another man, one must ‘really’ be a woman. 
	However, even when they are not characterized as maximized versions of homosexuality, transgender and intersex pose particular challenges to the assertion that same-sex activity is wrong. Both phenomena demonstrate that it is not always clear which definitions of sex and gender are being used by theologians who oppose same-sex relationships. John Hare notes that Church of England teaching on sexuality and marriage ‘depends … on the ability to define and recognize two sexes, male and female; to assign appropriate roles to each; and to define their appropriate behaviour’ (Hare 2007: 99). He believes that intersex, in particular, has profound implications for Church of England debates on gender, sexuality and same-sex relationships. 
The existence of intersex may raise problems for theologians who assert that marriage may only occur between men and women, since some intersex people will, for example, be legally classified as women despite having XY (‘male’) chromosomes. If an intersex woman with Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome​[2]​ married a non-intersex XY man, this would be two XY people marrying, which some Christians might class as a same-sex marriage. If the significant factor is not chromosomes but gender identity, this implies that marriages where one partner is transgender should also be legitimate, since, again, they might both have XY chromosomes, but one has a masculine and one a feminine gender identity.
This is, in fact, however, not what most theologians claim. Many theologians oppose marriage where one partner is transgender precisely because this would constitute a ‘same-sex’ marriage. In this instance, biology at birth is deemed to be the irreducible fact about someone. A man who lost his genitals in an accident would still be male, argues O’Donovan, so someone who has ‘lost’ his genitals by design, via sex reassignment surgery, is still male too (O’Donovan 1983: 145). God intended male bodies to be oriented toward female bodies; humans must accept this ‘givenness’ gladly (O’Donovan 1983: 152) and not transcend the boundaries of what it is appropriate to do in, through and to our bodies (O’Donovan 1983: 150-1). A marriage where one partner is transsexual, says O’Donovan, ‘will not be the union of a man and a woman, and so will not be a marriage at all’ (O’Donovan 1983: 156). This is echoed in the Evangelical Alliance’s document, Transsexuality, which states, ‘A transsexual relationship … cannot be regarded as truly being contracted between a man and a woman but between two partners of the same sex, one of whom has adopted a gender identity which is at variance with their biological sex’ (Evangelical Alliance 2000: 30). The EA’s guide for churches to the Gender Recognition Act 2004 says, ‘Under the GRA it is now legally possible for a transgendered person to “marry” someone of the same biological sex’ (Evangelical Alliance 2006: 4). The use of inverted commas makes it clear that this is not a real marriage as far as the EA is concerned, despite being legally recognized. The EA believes marriages involving transgender people ‘pass on to others experience of gender confusion and distort common-sense understanding of what constitutes family’ (Evangelical Alliance 2006: 9), and that ‘by definition transsexual relationships involve a lifestyle that excludes authentic sexual relations’ (Evangelical Alliance 2006: 26).
Many Christian theologians who oppose same-sex relationships, and believe same-sex marriage is impossible, do not define exactly what they believe constitutes sex. If pressed, many would probably – in common with contemporary social norms – appeal to chromosomes or gonads as ‘irreducibly’ defining sex. However, this will not be a good arbiter in the case of intersex people, who have some combination of chromosomes, gonads, genitals, sex cells, and gender identity different from that typical for males or females. All these should be considered in any analysis of what constitutes sex – and thus ‘same-sex’ relationships – for intersex people. 

5.	Types of sexual activity and challenges of unusual anatomy
What logic underlies the EA’s assertion that transsexual relationships exclude ‘authentic sexual relations’? In some Christian denominations, marriages are deemed to have been consummated only once full sexual intercourse has occurred. This is usually defined, as by the Roman Catholic Church, as intercourse in which the erect male penis penetrates the female vagina followed by male ejaculation within the vagina. Rodney Holder, an Anglican, argues that transsexualism might pose a problem for marriage: it may be impossible for people who have had genital surgery to consummate their marriages (Holder 1998a: 90; Holder 1998b: 130). Nonetheless, Holder does not believe that transgender marriages are illegitimate, since the intention of the transgender partner is to enter into what they understand as a heterosexual marriage (Holder 1998b: 131, 134), and the genitals have been altered ‘to remedy a severe disfunction’ (Holder 1998b: 132).
It is true that penetrative vaginal sexual intercourse may be impossible for some transgender and intersex people. Intersex people with ‘ambiguous’ genitalia may not have a vaginal opening capable of being penetrated, or a penis capable of penetrating a vagina and/or ejaculating. Intersex people’s ability to have this kind of sexual intercourse may have been compromised by genital surgery, designed to make the genitals appear more typical, which has left scarring. For some transgender people, penetrative sexual intercourse will be impossible either because they have not had genital surgery and so their genital anatomy still resembles that of their partner, or because the surgically-altered anatomy they do have still does not allow for penetrative sexual intercourse.
The question, then, is whether penetrative vaginal sex followed by male ejaculation inside the vagina must always be deemed to have a different cosmic and/or theological significance from other kinds of sexual activity. One reason why it should is that this is how children are most commonly conceived. Potentially procreative sex is often understood, theologically, as different in kind from deliberately non-procreative sex – variously held to include sex between same-sex partners, heterosexual sex using contraception, and heterosexual sexual activity avoiding male ejaculation in the vagina, such as oral, anal, and intercrural (between the thighs) sex. For Roman Catholic theologians in particular, sex where contraception is used prevents sex signifying all it is designed to signify, namely openness and hospitality to one’s partner and any children who may be conceived. 
 However, for many transgender and intersex people, the question of procreative sex is moot: they are unlikely to be able to conceive in any case. For transgender people in heterosexual relationships (with people of the same biological sex but the opposite gender as themselves), conception via penetrative sex will not be possible because their partner makes the same gametes (eggs or sperm) as they do. For some intersex people, penetrative sex is impossible because of the specific nature of their genital anatomy. For some other intersex people, penetration may be possible but conception may not: women with Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome usually have vaginas, but have no uterus or ovaries, so cannot conceive children. For these groups of people, if a type of sexual activity of which they are physically incapable is given cosmic significance over and above other kinds of sexual activity of which they are capable, their own sexual activity may be written out of signification. There are overlaps here with the experiences of some people with disabilities, who may similarly be unable to take part in penetrative vaginal intercourse followed by male ejaculation inside the vagina because of specific physical limitations.
Many Christian denominations do legitimize the use of contraception, which means that the procreative meaning of sexual activity has already been separated out from its other meanings, namely union and sexual fulfilment for the partners. Theologies which legitimize contraception may find it harder to justify the continued insistence that penetrative vaginal sex is cosmically different from other sexual activity (Williams 2002). 
Some theologians appeal to the biblical notion that sexual intercourse mystically joins the partners so that – per Genesis 2:24 and 1 Corinthians 6:17 – their spirits are united and they become ‘one flesh’. However, the Bible never makes explicit exactly what kind of physical activity carries this mystical power. We cannot assume on the grounds of the Bible alone that only penetrative vaginal sex followed by male ejaculation inside the vagina is spiritually significant in this way.
The theological privileging of penetrative vaginal sex may also represent a bias toward male sexual experience: Shere Hite famously argued, on the grounds of research with hundreds of women, that most do not find penetration sexually stimulating in its own right and are unlikely to experience orgasm through penetration alone (Hite 1976). Theologies which insist that only penetrative vaginal sex is ‘real’ risk excluding some transgender and some intersex people. They risk failing to engage as fully as they could with the ethical and moral significance of a range of sexual activity. This leaves other kinds of sexual activity in a strange limbo where they are either not acknowledged as significant at all, or are deemed perverse in some way. 
In an essay setting out his opposition to sex reassignment surgery for transgender people, O’Donovan argues that respecting living forms means recognizing the limits of how it is legitimate to alter them. He says, ‘To known [sic] oneself as body is to know that there are only certain things that one can do and be, because one’s freedom must be responsible to a given form, which is the form of one’s own experience in the material world’ (O’Donovan 1983: 151). Furthermore, O’Donovan believes that genitals constructed artificially for a transsexual person are not really part of the person’s body. He says,

Whatever the surgeon may be able to do, and whatever he may yet learn to do, he cannot make self out of not-self. He cannot turn an artifact into a human being’s body. The transsexual can never say with justice: ‘These organs are my bodily being, and their sex is my sex’. (O’Donovan 1983: 152) 

As a result, for O’Donovan, whatever these genitals may communicate during sexual activity with a partner, it is less than the whole truth.
	A similar argument occurs in Roman Catholic theology. In Roman Catholic Canon Law, consummation of a marriage is rendered impossible if either spouse is deemed ‘permanently organically impotent’. Circumstances constituting permanent organic impotence in a woman include having a vagina constructed from artificial materials (Dacanáy 2000: 37-38, 40). The argument is that a vagina which has not been created from human materials is not entirely a human organ. It therefore cannot be legitimately used for sexual acts performed ‘in a human fashion’, one of the criteria which must be satisfied in order for consummation to have occurred. The case for vaginas made artificially but from human materials is less certain, though Dacanáy states explicitly that the affirmation of the constructed vagina as a human organ ‘could not be made for transsexual surgeries’ (Dacanáy 2000: 40).

6.	Pathology or benign variation?
	Physical differences such as those caused by intersex have sometimes been understood as pathological. Cultural representations of ‘hermaphrodites’ sometimes figure them as monsters, freaks or degenerates. In contemporary Christian theology, intersex people are more likely to be treated compassionately, but their bodies may nonetheless be understood as problematic, not innocuous variations but pathological deviations from legitimate maleness or femaleness. For example, Dennis P. Hollinger, a conservative evangelical theologian, understands intersex conditions as ‘results of the fallen condition of our world, including the natural world … All distortions in the world are to be judged against the divine creational givens. In a fallen world there will be chaos and confusion that extends even to human sexuality’ (Hollinger 2009: 84). Charles Colson describes intersex people as ‘afflicted with [a] deformity’, saying, ‘The Bible teaches that the Fall into sin affected biology itself – that nature is now marred and distorted from its original perfection. This truth gives us a basis for fighting evil, for working to alleviate disease and deformity – including helping those unfortunate children born with genital deformities’ (Colson 1996). Hollinger and Colson are not saying intersex people are unusually sinful, or have done something wrong to cause their conditions. Nonetheless, they understand intersex as evidence of something amiss in the world. Hollinger and Colson appeal to what they understand as God’s creational norms, which mean that humans are male and female by design, any deviation from this representing a mistake or a problem.
	However, other theologians maintain that human sex is more complicated than that. For Virginia Ramey Mollenkott, the binary male and female system represents a distortion of the reality of a spectrum of sexed embodiment. Christians, suggests Mollenkott, should celebrate more different kinds of identity and embodiment. In what she calls an ‘omnigender’ world, intersex bodies are not problems, but ‘reminders of Original Perfection’ (Mollenkott 2007: 99), from a time before narrow human social norms were concretized. An intersex woman, Angela Moreno, uses similar imagery herself when she describes her large clitoris, surgically removed when she was 12: 

I loved it … I had this wonderful relationship with it … I think of that time that I had,  … maybe six months before surgery from the time that I noticed it and started to love it ‘til the time that it was taken from me, … [as] this time in the pleasure garden before the fall. (Moreno, speaking in Chase 1996)

Justin Tanis, too, appeals to Genesis, claiming, ‘The act of creation, even while differentiating between elements of creation, still leaves space for “in between” things: dusk, dawn, intersexed persons. God blesses all those parts of creation, calling them good’ (Tanis 2003: 59). Mollenkott’s notion of omnigender has its own problems: for example, she seems to advocate glossing over differences between sexes and genders (Mollenkott 2007: 186), a tactic which might ironically end up erasing rather than endorsing variation. However, her acknowledgement that binary sex as a system stems, at least partly, from social constructions about what bodies signify, means her theology is more open to intersex and transgender variations than many theologies grounded in a strongly binary-sexed model. 
	Intersex and transgender people have often worked hard to convince others that they are not ‘mistakes’, but good creations of God. Some scholars suggest there are overlaps between non-pathologizing discourses of intersex embodiment and non-pathologizing discourses of variant embodiment for people with disabilities (Koyama 2006; Cornwall 2009). Intersex bodies and disabled bodies might both be figured as differing from the statistical norm in some way, and posing particular challenges in their own right, but also, at least in part, made more problematic because of social reactions to them. 
	Some theologians note that, often, impaired people are told by well-meaning Christians that they will inevitably be healed in the afterlife (Lewis 2007: 65-75). This shifts the problems faced by disabled people back onto disabled bodies, not social failure to accommodate them. It may also reinforce links between disability and sin, whether personal or the general effects of sin on creation (Yong 2011: 60-61). The idea of healing might be empowering for some disabled people, but others find the notion that their impairment might be removed difficult, fearing this could compromise their identity. Consequently, J. David Hester suggests that Christians should be circumspect about discussing ‘healing’ in terms of the removal of a physical difference. In the case of intersex, he argues, ‘“Healing” is not “healing from”, but living comfortably and healthily with oneself as intersex’ (Hester 2006: 48). Furthermore, ‘healing’ might be for whole societies as they learn to navigate and celebrate living in relation to God and other humans in a variety of bodies. Hester says,

Unquestioning acceptance of intersexed bodies as normal and natural seems to be a powerful means of ‘healing’ … Intersex people whose bodies diverge from the gender ideal nevertheless find ‘health’ through integration into the community and acceptance of their own bodies. (Hester 2006: 52)

Hester notes that many intersex people who have ‘found healing’ have joined support groups where they can talk and share experiences with intersex people like themselves (Hester 2006: 54-55, 65). But Christian communities might, similarly, be understood as places where love and a shared identity in Christ provide healing from the rejection some intersex and transgender people experience in society. What Hester finds in the intersex people’s testimonies he analyzes is ‘a rhetoric of truth-telling that seeks to undo the implicit pathology of the condition, a pathology that has been orchestrated by silence and paternalism’ (Hester 2006: 55). Truth-telling in Christian communities might therefore mean exposing how Christian narratives have been complicit in reinforcing narrowly-sexed social norms, and appealing to a greater legitimacy for bodies grounded in their status as creations of God. In this way, intersex people might be liberated from the burden of being forced into a box their bodies were never intended to fit.

7.	Ethical issues surrounding surgery
	Whilst many issues facing intersex people and transgender people theologically and socially are similar, there are also important differences between them, some of which have led to tensions between the groups. For example, whilst many transgender people choose to pursue surgery and/or hormone therapy to make their bodies ‘match’ their gender identities, many intersex people have experienced ‘corrective’ genital surgery against their will. Some intersex people understand these surgeries as invasive, abusive, and damaging to the integrity of the people they originally were. 
	An important difference between transgender and intersex experiences of surgery is that, in most cases, sex reassignment surgery for transgender people does not take place until they are over 18 and have lived publicly for a year in their acquired gender. Some transgender people report difficulty in accessing surgical intervention, especially where such surgery is very expensive and transgender people must pay for it themselves or convince ‘gatekeeper’ doctors or insurance companies that it is medically necessary. By contrast, most initial surgery for intersex takes place on babies and young children, and many need repeat operations throughout their lives. Whilst surgery and other medical intervention for transgender people might endorse their agency and capacity to make decisions about their bodies, surgery for intersex people is likely – especially if it occurred when they were very young, or without their consent – to be understood as invading or compromising their agency.
	How can theologies for intersex and transgender people simultaneously endorse the goodness of ‘bodies as they are’ in the case of intersex, and acknowledge that pre-surgery bodies are sometimes sources of frustration, anxiety and even disgust for some transgender people? One significant theological consideration here is ‘givenness’. As we saw above, some Christian opponents to sex reassignment surgery for transgender people believe it is wrong for human to alter their bodies in this way, because bodies are given by God as they are. However, intersex Christians have also argued that their bodies are how God made them and intended them to be, and that God does not make mistakes. Interestingly, some transgender people also appeal to ‘givenness’ as a good, but for them it is gender that is ‘given’ and therefore should not be changed, rather than bodily sex. Rachel Mann, a transgender Christian, says of her sex reassignment surgery,

It was an act of violence against the normal course of things. And yet without it I would not have achieved the degree and depth of self-reconciliation that I have … There is part of me that can see that life would have been easier and simpler if … I could have accepted my maleness and male body; but the fact is that, as painful as the surgery was, I would choose it again and again rather than be a man. (Mann 2012: 94)

	Surgery may have implications for intersex and transgender people’s capacity to enjoy sexual activity, and this raises its own ethical questions. Some critics of corrective surgery on intersex babies and children argue that, in the past, surgeons were more concerned about the finished genitals’ cosmetic appearance than their capacity to feel sexual pleasure. Appearance is not unimportant, especially if the child will be getting changed in front of other people during sports or swimming lessons, or at the beach. But to what extent is it ethically legitimate to privilege appearance over capacity for sensation? In particular, some critics have accused surgeons of sexism, constructing vaginas understood mainly as passive holes or penis-receptacles, rather than body-parts which can feel sexual pleasure in their own right (Dreger 1998: 184; Kessler 1998: 55-6; Preves 2003: 56; Arana 2005: 19). As a result, more recently, some intersex activists have argued that no aesthetic surgery for intersex should take place before the child is old enough to understand the implications of conducting or not conducting surgery, and to be involved in the decision-making process. 
	Despite the differences between intersex and transgender concerns about surgery, then, some similar sets of ethical questions arise. Should surgery take place at all? If so, when and how? Who should decide? Issues of autonomy and self-determination apply to both intersex and transgender people. Sexual theologies for intersex and transgender people should acknowledge that their bodily integrity is as important as anyone else’s, and that their experiences of undergoing unwanted surgery, or being unable to access surgery they consider necessary, may negatively affect their body-image, sense of self, and capacity to find sexual activity pleasurable and enjoyable. Sexual theologies for transgender and intersex people should celebrate them as they are, stand with those whose bodies discomfit or disturb them, and support them in decisions about their bodies, whether this involves surgical intervention or not.
	
8.	Vulnerability in sexual encounter
	Sexual relationships always involve vulnerability. Physically, being wholly or partially naked, and exposing one’s genitals in someone else’s presence, puts one in a position where one cannot easily defend oneself from attack. Emotionally, sexual intercourse as an expression of intimacy means opening one’s private inner self up to another person and trusting that they will not abuse the privilege. Any sexual relationship, whether with a long-term partner or a relative stranger, has an element of risk attached.
	Intersex and transgender people may find themselves at particular risk in sexual relationships. For some, their unusual genital appearance (whether because they have been born with ambiguous genitalia, or because they have had surgery to alter their genitalia) is a source of fear and disquiet which makes them wary of getting into sexual relationships because they do not know how others will react. They may also lack confidence because of their genital appearance. For some transgender people, especially those who have transitioned gender but not had genital surgery, there may be a ‘mismatch’ between the gender in which they ‘pass’ and their genital appearance. This puts them at risk of violence or attack when sexual partners first learn (before, during or after sex) that they are transgender. Sadly, there are numerous cases of transpeople having been assaulted, wounded and even killed by sexual partners who felt they had been ‘deceived’.  
	For intersex and transgender people even more than others, then, trust and confidence in sexual partners’ goodwill and acceptance will be important in order to ensure, as far as possible, physical and emotional safety. What Christian ethical resources are there for promoting just and life-affirming sexualities? Farley suggests seven principles for just sexual behaviour which Christians should take into account. These are:
	Do no unjust harm. Since sexual activity makes people vulnerable to one another, we should not abuse this vulnerability by deliberately betraying or deceiving our sexual partners (Farley 2006: 217).
	Free consent. We should not be violent or coercive in our sexual relationships, but should be truthful, keep our promises, and be transparent with our partners (Farley 2006: 219). 
	Mutuality. Sex should be a reciprocal aspect of relationships in which both partners give and receive freely, not something to be forced or endured (Farley 2006: 222).
	Equality. Unequal amounts of power in a relationship will lead to coercion and exploitation (Farley 2006: 223). 
	Commitment. This entails both a commitment of time, giving sexual relationships a chance to deepen and mature, and a commitment to equality, mutuality and justice (Farley 2006: 226).
	Fruitfulness. Sexual interactions have consequences for other people beyond the partners themselves. Just, loving sexual relationships should free the participants to look outwards and promote love and inclusion for others in their community, not to be entirely absorbed in each other (Farley 2006: 228).
	Social justice. This entails always treating other people as ends in themselves, and taking responsibility for our sexual choices and their consequences (Farley 2006: 229).

9.	Conclusion
	When considering sexual theologies for intersex and transgender people, it is important to note that both groups have, at times, suffered from stereotypes and projections from others about their sexual selves. Both intersex and transgender people have sometimes been figured as excessively or peculiarly sexual, with prurient media fascination about genital anatomy and sexual behaviour surrounding the coverage of early high-profile transpeople such as Christine Jorgensen, and with intersex people sometimes having been characterized as insatiable, super-sexual ‘hermaphrodites’. Conversely, intersex people in particular have also suffered a sometime characterization as asexual, unable to participate in ‘normal’ sex at all and therefore somehow lacking in sexuality (Colligan 2004: 50). Ironically, intersex people’s asexualization may have been exacerbated by the desire of some activists and allies to distance intersex conditions from the queer and LGBT identity politics with which they were sometimes associated in the 1990s – but intersex activist Emi Koyama says that ‘for intersex people to truly achieve acceptance, it makes no sense to retreat from the conversations about gender and sexuality’ (Koyama 2006). It almost goes without saying that, in actual fact, transgender people and intersex people are sexed and sexual, but no more or less so by virtue of their conditions than non-transgender and non-intersex people. Abby L. Wilkerson argues that, since oppressed people often also find themselves oppressed or marginalized sexually – or made to play out their sexuality only in particular stereotypical ways – for some groups, eroticization on their own terms may be an important way of resisting stereotyped characterization (Wilkerson 2012: 185). Wilkerson adds that intersex people’s ‘public reflections on sexuality’ are valuable, making clear that healthy sexualities might ‘encompass a range of pleasures and identities, rather than evaluating the eroticism of bodily configurations and practices on the basis of their proximity to a predetermined norm’ (Wilkerson 2012: 202).
	This kind of logic underlies efforts by intersex and transgender people to identify proto-intersex and proto-transgender figures in the Bible, to endorse the goodness, naturalness and non-pathology of such body-identities. In this way, they aim to show that Christian theological assertions about only non-transgender maleness and femaleness being desirable, good, ‘real’ identities are inadequate. For some intersex and transgender people, the scriptural eunuchs are important, representing people who stood outside conventional sex-gender categories and, sometimes, had atypical genital anatomy. One intersex Christian, David Forrester, notes of Jesus’ teaching about eunuchs in Matthew 19, 

I scoured the Bible to find out anything to do with intersex and I was thrilled when I discovered that Jesus spoke about it. My interpretation of what Jesus said about eunuchs … I thought that was wonderful, yes. And that was the springboard for my faith. I thought, Jesus knows I exist! I’m not on my own. Because I thought I was the only one in the world, you see. (Forrester 2012) 

Liberating theologies for transgender and intersex people will endorse the goodness of different kinds of embodiment, and critique interventions more concerned with upholding conservative social norms than respecting the agency and integrity of the bodies in question. This does not mean all gender should be eradicated or rendered obsolete: for people who have fought long and hard for the specificities of their body-identities to be recognized as legitimate, good sites of God’s grace, declaring an end to gender difference may risk disappearance of their specificity or a new silencing of their voices. Indeed, remarks Farley, 

Once we see other possibilities for gendering, gender is itself rendered at once more important and less. It is more important for those who must struggle to discover their gender identity and come to be at home in it. It is less important as a way to exclude some identities from the circle of our common humanity. (Farley 2006: 155)

Liberation means being supported to live safely in a particular body, even if it is unusual and troubling, even if it is ‘ambiguous’, and even if it is not the body that others believe one ‘should’ have. Liberation also means emancipation from tired stereotypes about sex and gender in social and cultural terms, and from theological anthropologies grounded in outmoded medical and scientific paradigms. This entails being critical of how theologians and the Christian Churches have discussed sex and gender in the past: in an essay on intersex, Roman Catholic ethicist Patricia Beattie Jung comments,

It is reasonable to expect magisterial interpretations of biblical texts to be readily corroborated not only by the best of biblical scholarship but also to cohere with cogent interpretations of relevant human experiences and with the best scientific data and philosophical arguments available. (Jung 2006: 305)

	The assumption that transgender always stems from psychological disturbance seems to go hand in hand, in some theological accounts, with the assumption that reproductive sexual activity is the divinely-ordained ideal and that anyone who deliberately chooses to render reproduction impossible via sex reassignment surgery cannot be psychologically healthy (Central Board of Finance 1991: 26-7). Appeals to gender complementarity also recur in this literature (Central Board of Finance 1991: 37-8). I have noted elsewhere that ‘holding as pre-existent “known fact” that all transgender people are mentally ill or delusional profoundly undermines their legitimacy as authors and actors of their own identities, and fails to disturb the genital-centric model of human sex’ (Cornwall 2010: 125). Liberating theologies for transgender and intersex people allow them to make decisions about their own bodies and bodily expressions without an automatic assumption that they are incapable of responsibly and reflectively doing so.  
Indeed, argues transgender theologian Vanessa Sheridan,

Seeking personal spiritual liberation through the good news of Jesus Christ will help us to accept our responsibilities and benefits as gender variant individuals, allowing us to more fully celebrate our transgendered orientation and identity as the true blessings from God that they are. (Sheridan 2001: 99)

This, she suggests, means refusing the definitions of themselves as peculiarly damaged or pathological which many transgender people encounter: ‘Liberation always begins when someone makes a decision to refuse the imposed definitions of others’ (Sheridan 2001: 100). Sheridan suggests that the biblical Exodus narrative, which she interprets as narrating an ‘alternative social vision for God’s people’, can ‘speak directly to the hearts and spirits of contemporary transgendered Christians’ (Sheridan 2001: 105).  
Tanis suggests transgender people might be liberated by figuring gender as a calling: a discovery of who God intends them to be, recognizing that callings can emerge gradually, are ongoing, and can be permanent or for a season (Tanis 2003: 156). Through coming into their calling, suggests Tanis, transgender people might experience ‘truth, realness, and integrity in which we come to know ourselves better than we did before … We experience the affirmation that we are fully revealed and known to God’ (Tanis 2003: 168). Mann notes that this does not necessary entail denying one’s own former history, but that transpeople’s relationships with their histories in another gender may nonetheless be difficult or painful for themselves and others: ‘One of the costs of my emergent identity has been to make it difficult for my family to speak confidently about my early life as a boy and young man. There is a sense in which, for my family as a whole, my early life has been lost’ (Mann 2012: 22). 
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^1	  The Gender Recognition Act 2004 in British law allows transgender people to have the gender in which they now live (their ‘acquired gender’) legally recognized. This means a transgender person can obtain a new birth certificate listing the acquired gender rather than the gender originally assigned at birth, and their new name if this differs from the name given at birth. The Act also affords transgender people the right to marry someone of the opposite gender (i.e. the same biological sex), although clergy in the Church of England and Church in Wales are not obliged to marry someone they believe to be living in an acquired gender. The Act does not change someone’s legal status as parent to an existing child. The full text of the Act is available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/7/contents. 
^2	  Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome is a condition where an XY foetus, which would usually develop into a male, cannot respond to androgens (‘male’ hormones), so although there are internal male features such as testes, the external genitalia are female, with a vaginal opening, clitoris and labia. Almost all people with AIS are brought up as girls and continue to live as women in adulthood.
